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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff'Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On the 17th day of January 1974, Federal and State 
Agents entered the premises at 155 East 3rd North, 
Logan, Utah, finding therein among others, Appellant, 
Romeo Aldo Beorchia. In the process of arresting an-
other individual, certain fire arms were located on the 
premises and the Appellant was arrested under the pro-
visions of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 in that the 
Appellant was alleged to have possessed a dangerous 
weapon while not a citizen of the United States. The 
Appellant made certain Motions to the Court, specifically 
that the Statute under which the Appellant was charged 
was unconstitutional and the Appellant further objected 
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to the Jury array, arguing that selection of Jury was lim-
ited by an unconstitutional standard. The Court took the 
objections under advisement and a Jury Trial was had 
and at the close of the State's evidence the Appellant 
moved for a Dismissal on the ground that the State had 
failed to prove that there was possession in the Appellant 
as a matter of law. The Court took that Motion under 
advisement as well and the Appellant put on his case 
and as the close of the evidence the Jury returned a ver-
dict of guilty. In a subsequent hearing the Court denied 
the Motions of the Appellant and sentenced him to 0 to 
5 years in the State Penitentiary from which sentence the 
Appellant appealed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant was tried and convicted of Possession 
of a Dangerous weapon while not a citizen of the United 
States in the District Court in and for Cache County, 
before the Honorable VeNoy Christensen. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the lower 
court. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I. 
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 78-46-8 CONFORMS WITH 14TH 
AMENDMENT STANDARDS AS TO EQUAL 
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PROTECTION AND TO 5TH AMENDMENT 
STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THAT THE JURY 
ARRAY WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSTI-
TUTED. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT 
WAS ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S EVIDENCE 
IN THAT THE STATE DID NOT SHOW 
POSSESSION WAS IN THE APPELLANT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 76-10-503 VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THAT AMENDMENT. 
POINT IV. 
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 76-10-503 AS APPLIED TO THE AP-
PELLANT, IS VIOLATIVE OF APPEL-
LANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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POINT V. 
THE LAWS REGULATING ALIENS HAV-
ING BEEN PREEMPTED BY THE FEDER-
AL GOVERNMENT ARE THE SOLE AND 
SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTI-
CLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND U. C. A. 76-
10-503 AMOUNTS TO AN INTERFERENCE 
IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 78-46-8 CONFORMS WITH 14TH 
AMENDMENT STANDARDS AS TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND TO 5TH AMENDMENT 
STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THAT THE JURY 
ARRAY WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSTI-
TUTED. 
While it is true that the common law principal that 
a Defendant was entitled to a "Judgment of his peers" 
referred to in the Magna Carta tihis principle is not 
necessarily still the proper criteria for jury selection, see 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, P. 85, 86 L. Ed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
680, P. 707, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942). In the Gktsser case the 
Court said that the proper functioning of the Jury sys-
tem, and indeed, of democracy itself, requires that a 
Jury be "a body truly representative of the community 
and not an organ of any special group or class". It is 
not the Appellant's position that he was necessarily en-
titled to have an alien or aliens sit on his jury but rather 
that be was entitled to a constitutional jury under the 
standard laid down in the Glasser case. Under Utah Code 
Annotated 78-46-8, applicable portions are: 
78-46-8. WHO IS COMPETENT TO SERVE. 
A person shall be competent to sit as a Juror: 
(1) Who is a citizen of the United States over 
tiie age of twenty-one years; 
(2) Who can read and write the English lan-
guage; 
(3) Who resides in and has resided in the coun-
try for six months next preceding the time he 
is selected; . . . required shall be residence in 
the city or precinct for six months next preced-
ing the time actually called to serve; 
(4) Who is a taxpayer in the State, and, 
(5) Who is of sound mind and discretion, and 
not so disabled in body as to be unable to serve. 
It can be seen that in no way does the Statute pro-
vide for a representative cross section of the community. 
In fact, the very jury selection process in Cache County 
precludes any possibility of getting a cross section of the 
community because the jury is selected from the rolls 
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of the registered voters which in itself would exclude 
important classes of people, to-wit; people who do not 
meet the residency requirement under voters registration 
statutes and people under eighteen. But the Statute it-
self goes even farther than the selective process in ex-
cluding segments of the community. The Statute also 
excludes people who do not pay taxes and excludes per-
sons on the basis of citizenship, as well as the age and 
residency bar which is actually imposed through the jury 
selection system as practiced in Cache County. In the 
Utah case of Reese, et al. v. Knott, at 24 P. 757, 3 U. 466, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a Utah Statute pro-
viding that only a taxpayer shall be eligible to sit on the 
Jury is in violation of the United States Constitution 
Article VII, which declares that "The right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved." Although this a somewhat an-
cient case it has never been overruled and would appear 
to be good law and would therefore be conclusive in favor 
of Appellant's position in this case. We need not rely 
exclusively on the Utah case, how€>ver, in the case of 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), the United States Supreme Court 
held that in serious criminal cases the Defendant shall 
have the right to trial by Jury. Implicit in the holding 
of the Court, is the proposition that the Defendant shall 
have the right to trial by a cxxnstitutional jury which, the 
Appellant contends, was not the case here. It matters 
not that the Appellant cannot show that there was dam-
age resulting from the fact that the jury excluded certain 
classes of persons. The Appellant could contend that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fact that aliens were precluded from serving on his jury 
by action of the Statute worked to his detriment but he 
need not go that far. In the case of Peters v. Kiff, 407 
U. S. 493, 33 L. Ed. 2d 83, 92 S. Ot 2163 (1972), the 
United States Supreme Court held that, whatever his 
race, a State criminal Defendant has standing to chal-
lenge the system used to select his grand or petit jury, 
on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service 
the members of any race and thereby denies him due 
process of law. It not being necessary that Appellant 
show actual harm or bias; as in Peters v. Kiff, supra, 
where a white Defendant claimed that a practice whereby 
negroes were systematically excluded from the jury ser-
vice, particularly where congress had made such exclu-
sion by public officials a crime, give the Appellant stand-
ing to invoke his claim. In the instant case we have the 
same factual basis in that 42 U. S. Code § 1981, which 
was originally enacted to protect the rights of negroes 
also applies to aliens. In Roberto v. Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company, 111 Fed. 2d 811, Cert. Den., 339 U. S. 
929 (1949), the Federal Circuit Court construed that 
Statute in holding that: 
"Although enacted primarily to insure equal 
civil rights to negroes, it has been held that the 
protection of this Section extends to Aliens as 
well as citizens." 
It would therefore seem that under the Federal Legisla-
tion not only of the 42 U. S. Code § 1981 cited above, but 
also under 18 U. S. C. § 243, the Appellant would enjoy 
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the same protection as if he were a minority race. Under 
Utah Law as well as Federal Law all of the rights of the 
Constitution are reserved to "The people" or "To all 
persons" which would then necessarily include the Ap-
pellant although he is a citizen of Italy. See also Strauder 
v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664, in which 
the Court held that: 
"Prejudices often exist against particular classes 
in the community, which sway the Judgment of 
the Jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some 
cases to deny persons of those classes the full 
enjoyment of that protection which others en-
joy." 
Such is the case with aliens as so aptly observed in 
Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P. 2d 645, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 77 (1969). The Court noted that the concept of 
equal protection of the laws compels recognization of 
the proposition that persons similarly situated with re-
spect to the Legislative purpose of the law receive equal 
treatment thereunder and then went on to say: 
"Aliens . . . denied the right to vote, lack the 
most basic means of defending themselves in 
the political processes." 
See also, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
599, 87 S. Ct. 643 (1967), and other cases cited in the 
Annotation accompanying Peters v. Kiff, at 33 L. Ed. 2d 
783, P. 791. Another recent United States Supreme Court 
case, In Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 37 L. Ed. 2d 910, 93 
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S. Ct. 2851 (1973), the United States Supreme Court 
held that a Citizenship may not be prescribed by a state 
as a requirement for practice of law. The Courts recog-
nized that the fact that a person is an alien does not 
necessarily mean that he would be unqualified as a prac-
titioner of law and by analogy the fact that a person is 
not a citizen or that a person is not a taxpayer would 
not preclude him from sitting on a jury. It is true that 
the cases hold that the State has no requirement to in-
clude aliens in its democratic political institutions and 
that the right to vote and the right to hold high public 
office is not necessarily violative of an alien's rights. See 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 37 L. Ed. 2d 853, 
93 S. Ot. 2842 (1973), but these cases are not con-
trolling as this issue is presented. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT 
WAS ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S EVIDENCE 
IN THAT THE STATE DID NOT SHOW 
POSSESSION WAS IN THE APPELLANT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellant submits that under the instructions given 
to the Jury and based on the record at trial, the Appel-
lant was not in possession of the fire arms as a matter 
of law and the verdict was therefore not supported by 
the evidence. 
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POINT III. 
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 76-10-503 VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THAT AMENDMENT. 
The Appellant does not feel that this is a second 
Amendment issue under the United States Constitution 
for the purpose of this argument. The State can cite 
many cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, most of great antiquity, which hold that the 
restrictions upon the control of guns in the Constitution 
of the United States, as set forth in the 2nd Amendment 
thereto, apply only to the congress of the United States 
and not to the Legislatures of the several states. It would 
seem then that we are only to consider the U. S. Constitu-
tion and the Laws oi the State of Utah applied to the con-
trol of guns and the limitations therein as set forth in the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. We may consider 
then, the Constitution of the United States in so far as 
the control prescribed by Utah law violates the protec-
tion of the 14th Amendment as set forth in the Due 
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of that 
Amendment. Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah reads as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS. The people have 
the right to bear arms for their security and de-
fense, but the legislature may regulate the exer-
cise of this right by law." 
This provision setting forth the right of the people of 
the State of Utah to bear arms differs from the compara-
ble Federal Provisions and the provisions in the Consti-
tutions of many of the other states in significant respects. 
In the first place, the Utah Constitution does not limit 
the bearing of arms to citizens as do the Constitutions 
of some states, see Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 
138, 34 S. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (1914). Further, Article 
I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution cited above does 
not purport to give unlimited right to all persons to bear 
arms and sets forth therein the limitation that the legis-
lature may regulate this right. It remains then, only 
to inquire as to whether the invoking of the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503, as to the Appellant 
herein is violative of his rights to due process and equal 
protection under the laws. It is well established that the 
legislature may single out a class of person and place 
special burdens on that class, provided that that class 
manifests characteristics which, to a real and substantial 
extent, distinguish that class from all other persons and 
justify an imposition of the burden. It is also well es-
tablished that the police power of the State is for the 
purpose of protecting the health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare of the people but, the legislature, acting un-
der such power, must have such purpose in classification 
of a group in imposing burdens on that group and with-
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holding the same burden from other classes. The distinc-
tion made by the legislature must be based on a real and 
substantial difference of the classes, and such difference 
must be relevant to the purpose which the legislation is 
intended to achieve. The Appellant submits that he has 
been lawfully admitted in the Country under Federal 
law, and therefore he has a Federal privilege to enter 
and abide in any state in the union and thereafter under 
the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States to enjoy equal protection of the laws in any State 
in which he abides. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 
S. Ct., 60 L. Ed. 131 (1915), in the Truax decision, the 
Court noted that it has on occasion sustained State 
Legislation that did not apply equally to citizens and 
noncitizens, the grounds for this distinction being that 
such laws were necessary to protect a special interest 
either of the State or the citizen of the State. A special 
interest of the citizens of the State of California was 
asserted in the case of Tahahashi v. Fish and Game Com-
mission, 334 U. S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 1478, 68 S. Ct. 1138 
(1948). In that case the Court held that under the 
United States Constitution, the power is withheld from 
the several states to determine what aliens should or 
should not be admitted to the United States, the period 
that aliens may remain in the United States, the regula-
tion of alien conduct before naturalization and the terms 
and conditions of alien naturalization. The Court then 
held that the States can neither add nor take from the 
conditions lawfully imposed by congress upon admission 
to or naturalization and residence in the United States 
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and in the several states. The Court went on to state 
that the 14th Amendment and the law adopted under its 
authority embody a policy that all persons lawfully in 
this country may abide in any state with equality of 
legal privilege to that of the citizens of the state of resi-
dence under nondiscriminatory laws. The Takahashi case 
seems controlling in determining the Appellant's rights 
under the laws of Utah. The Appellant does not, by 
this argument, state that under no condition may any 
alien be precluded from owning a fire arm or possessing 
the same, but only argues that the fact that he is an alien 
alone is not enough to impose this burden upon him. In 
Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, as amended by Title III of the Gun Control 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 1201, 1202 (1968), the Federal 
Government set forth Federal Prohibitions on the posses-
sion of fire arms as to certain classes of persons. 
Sec. 1202. The congress hereby finds and de-
clares that the receipt, possession, or transpor-
tation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are 
discharged under dishonorable conditions, men-
tal incompetents, aliens who are illegally in the 
country, and former citizens who have renounced 
their citizenship constitutes — 
(1) a burden on commerce or threat affect-
ing the free flow of commerce, 
(2) a threat to the safety of the President 
of the United States and Vice President of the 
United States, 
(3) an impediment or a threat to the ex-
ercise of free speech and the free exercise of a 
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religion guaranteed by the first amendment to 
the constitution of the United States, and 
(4) a threat to the continued and effective 
operation of the Government of the United 
States and of the government of each state guar-
anteed by article IV of the Constitution. Sec. 
1202. (a) Any person who — 
(1) has been convicted by a court of the 
United States or of a state or any political sub-
division thereof of a felony, or 
(2) has been discharged from the Armed 
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or 
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the 
United States or of a state or any political sub-
division thereof of being mentally incompetent, 
or 
(4) having been a citizen of the United 
States has renounced his citizenship, or 
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlaw-
fully in the United States, and who receives, 
possesses, or transports in commerce, or affect-
ing commerce, after the date of enactment of 
this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more 
than $10,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than 
two years, or both . . . 
It is noted that there are restrictions placed on cer-
tain classes of aliens based on special facts and circum-
stances just as there are restrictions placed on various 
classes of citizens based on special facts and circum-
stances. Appellant submits that the Court, upon finding 
that the legislature considered the group and found that 
the group, as a whole or to a large extent, contained spe-
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cial characteristics by which the group might be reason-
ably precluded from possession of fire arms, then the 
Court could conclude that legislation would entail a 
reasonable and valid classification. It seems apparent 
from the law itself, that the legislature of the State of 
Utah has made no reasonable classification, there is no 
more basis for prohibiting alien possession of a dangerous 
weapon than precluding the possession of a fire arm by 
any other person or group unless the Court is willing to 
accept the proposition that persons from other nations 
are inherently more lawless, that aliens are not subject 
to the same laws of the State of Utah as are others, that 
noncitizens are less controlled in their egress or ingress 
or that in some significant respect aliens are less whole-
some as a group than are citizens. The Appellant submits 
that there is not reasonable basis for any of these con-
clusions and challenges the State to produce one piece 
of evidence or case that so holds. Further the appellant 
challenges the State to show one special interest that 
could be claimed by the people of the State of Utah in 
having noncitizens precluded from possession of any fire 
arms within state borders that does not apply equally 
to other classes. In support of the Appellant's view, at-
tention is respectfully invited to recent United States 
Supreme Court cases and sister state cases construing 
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of 
the United States constitution as applied to classifica-
tion. In Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P. 2d 645, 
79 California 77, (1969), the California Supreme Court 
held that a state statute providing that: 
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"No contractor or subcontractor or agent or 
representative thereof shall knowingly employ or 
cause to or allow to be employed on public works 
an alien . . ." 
is violative of the 14th Amendment under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of that amendment in that it "Encroaches 
upon the congressional scheme for immigation and natur-
alization and interferes with provisions of The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 U. S. C. A. § 1011 
(1952), it was further held that the Statute 
"Offends the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution." 
In support of this proposition the Court cited Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 
L. Ed. 905 (1893). In adopting this view the California 
Court adopted the recent line of thinking in equal pro-
tection cases by the Supreme Court of the United States 
and noted that the concept of equal protection of the 
laws compels recognization of the proposition that per-
sons similarly situated with respect to a legitimate pur-
pose of the law receive like treatment. The Court went 
on to point out that in cases involving "Suspect Classifi-
cation" as defined in Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U. S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), or "Funda-
mental Interests" as defined in Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
169 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has pre-
scribed a strict standard for the review of a particular 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
enactment under the Equal Protection Clause. Not only 
must a classification reasonably relate to the purpose of 
the law, F. S. Royster Guano Company v. Virginia, 253 
U. S. 412, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989 (1920), but also 
the state must bear the burden of establishing that the 
Classification constituted a necessary means of accom-
plishing the legitimate State interest, Loving v. Virginia, 
383 U. S., 87 S. a . 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967). Ac-
cording to 82 Harvard Law Review 1065 (1972), Devel-
opments in the Law, equal protection cases were discussed 
as follows: 
"In cases involving suspect classificaitions or 
fundamental interest of those discriminated 
against however the Court has adopted an atti-
tude of vigorous scrutiny of the law." 
One of the reasons for this vigorous scrutiny was enun-
ciated in Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, supra, when 
the Court said that 
"Aliens, denied the right to vote, lack the most 
basic means of defending themselves in the po-
litical process." 
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), the Court said: 
"Absent compelling state interest, residency re-
quirements classifying welfare applicants vio-
lates the equal protection clauses of the 14th 
Amendment, in that it precludes the right of 
indigents to travel from state to state." 
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In the case of Dunn v. Blumstien, 405 U. S. 330, L. Ed. 
2d 774, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972), at page 345, the Court 
discusses the State of Tennessee's contention that a dura-
tional residency statute is necessary to control the evils of 
immigrant stuffing of ballot boxes. The Court pointed 
out that the fallacy in such an argument is that: 
"Durational residence law bars newly arrived 
residents from the franchise along with non resi-
dents." 
This is the evil of the Utah Statute as it is applied to 
the Appellant. There is no distinction between deserving 
aliens and undeserving aliens or any other standard in-
dependant of citizenship and therefore the classification 
is invidious and suspect and the State of Utah has not 
and cannot satisfy the requirements as enunciated in the 
controlling dassificaftion cases; that being that the State 
must bear the burden of justifying the classification. See 
also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436, 
88 S. Ct. 1509 (1969), another recent United States Su-
preme Court case, In Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 37 L. 
Ed. 2d, 91 S. Ct. 2851 (1973), the Supreme Court held 
that citizenship may not be prescribed by a State as a 
requirement for the practice of law. The Court recog-
nized that the fact that a person is an alien alone does 
not necessarily mean that he would be unqualified as a 
practitioner of law. 
POINT IV. 
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNO-
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TATED 76-10-503 AS APPLIED TO THE AP-
PELLANT, IS VIOLATIVE OF APPEL-
LANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
As stated in the case of Untermire v. State Tax Com-
mission, 102 Utah 214,129 P. 2d 881 (1942), the Supreme 
Court noted that Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah was substantially a summary of 
the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Federal Constitu-
tion and the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court 
are highly persuasive in the construction and application 
of Article I, Section VII of the Utah State Constitution, 
The Appellant therefore submits that, to a large extent, 
what has been held violative of due process and equal 
protection of the laws by the Supreme Court of the 
United States is also adopted and approved by the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah. In the case of State 
v. J. D. Walker and R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 323, 
116 P. 2d 766 (1941), the Supreme Court said that where 
some persons or transactions, excluding from operation 
of the law are, to the subject matter of the law, indis-
tinguishable from classes included in those operations 
then the law is discriminatory in the sense of being arbi-
trary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to dif-
ferentiate can be found, the law will be held constitu-
tional. In Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 
194 P. 2d 464 (1948), the Utah Court said that in de-
termining whether classifications made by the legislature 
are unconstitutional, discrimination is the very essence 
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of classificaition and is not objectionable unless founded 
upon an unreasonable distinction. It would therefore 
appear that the Appellant must show not only that there 
has been a discrimination but that the discrimination is 
based on citizenship alone and using the criteria of citi-
zenship alone is an unreasonable distinction. The Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah has not approached 
this precise issue. It would, however, appear that Taka-
hashi v. Fish and Game Commission, supra, has, and it 
appears that the Utah Court might follow that case as 
has its sister states. Classification on the basis of non-
citizenship alone is just as odious as classification based 
upon race, creed, or color. See Fugii v. State, 242 P. 2d 
(1952) and Namba v. McCourt, 204 P. 2d 569 (1949). It 
is interesting to note that these cases, the former issuing 
out of California and the later issuing out of Oregon, rely 
on Takahashi in overthrowing statutes in which it would 
appear that the people of those states might have some 
special interest land ownership. Assuming that land own-
ership is strictly a function of the state, the restrictions 
placed on state legislation in that area should be less than 
restrictions placed on state legislation affecting a person's 
individual rights protected by United States and State 
Constitutions. The Appellant submits that the whole rea-
son for the conferred constitutional right to bear arms is 
for one's self protection against tyranny of government 
and neighbors. The Appellant submits that the legislature 
of the State of Utah has passed a law which precludes 
him, without a rational basis therefore, of enjoying the 
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safety and security granted to other persons within this 
state. 
POINT V. 
THE LAWS REGULATING ALIENS HAV-
ING BEEN PREEMPTED BY THE FEDER-
AL GOVERNMENT ARE THE SOLE AND 
SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTI-
CLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND U. C. A. 76-
10-503 AMOUNTS TO AN INTERFERENCE 
IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. 
In the case of Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P. 
2d 645, 89 Cal. 77 (1969), the Calitfornit Supreme Court 
held that a California statute providing that: 
"No contractors or subcontractor or agent or 
representative thereof shall knowingly employ 
or cause to be employed on public work an alien 
. . . 
"Encroaches upon the congressional scheme for 
immigration and naturalization . . . interferes 
with . . . provisions of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1952' as set forth in 8 U. S. 
Code § 1011, et seq." 
and further that the Statute: 
"Offends the equal protection clause of the . . . 
the 14th Amendment to the U, S. Constitution." 
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In support of the ruling the California Court cited Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ot. 1016, 
37 L. Ed. 905 (1893), and the United State Constitution, 
Article I, § 8, Clause 4. 
In the case of Takahashi v. Fish and Game Com-
mission, 334 U. S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 1478, 68 S. Ot. 1138 
(1948), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
State, 
"Can neither add nor take from the conditions 
lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, 
naturalization and residence of aliens in the 
United States or the several States." 
In the case of Hines v. Dauidowitz, 312 U. S. 66, 61 S. 
Ot. 399, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941), the United States Supreme 
Court held that a state law requiring registration of 
aliens was unconstitutional in that it stood as: 
"An obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of con-
gress." 
and further stated that, 
"Experience has shown that International Con-
troversy of the greatest moment, sometimes even 
leading to war, may arise from real or imagined 
wrongs to another subject inflicted or permitted 
by a government." 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Court of California in the above cited cases 
under the authority granted in the U. S. Constitution, 
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Article I, Section 8, the Congress of the U. S. has pro-
vided an elaborate scheme for the supervision of aliens 
within this Country, including the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1952, supra. As previously noted 
in the Argument on another issue, Congress has also seen 
fit to regulate the possession of firearms by aliens, 7 U. S. 
C. A. 1201, et seq. (1968). These sections provide that 
an alien who is illegally or unlawfully within the United 
States or any alien having been a citizen of the United 
States and having renounced this citizenship shall not 
possess certain prescribed groups of firearms. In so pro-
viding, it would seem clear that the congress of the United 
States has completely preempted the several states in 
the area of control of possession of firearms by aliens by 
prescribing the exact limitations which apply to aliens 
an dto which aliens these limitations apply. In Hines v. 
Davidowitz, supra, the Court observed, 
"Consequently the regulation of aliens is so in-
timately blended and intertwined with respon-
sibilities of the national government that where 
it acts, and the State also acts on the same sub-
ject, 'The act of congress, or the treaty, is su-
preme; and the power of the State, though 
enacted in the exercise of powers not contro-
verted, must yield to it/ And where the Federal 
Government, in the exercise of its superior au-
thority in this field, has enacted a complete 
scheme of regulation and has therein provided 
a standard for registration of aliens, states can-
not inconsistently with the purpose of congress, 
conflict or interfere with, curtail or compliment, 
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the Federal Law, or enforce additional or auxil-
iary regulations . . ." 
An interesting case handed down by United States Su-
preme Court, that being Zschernig v. Miller, 389 
U. S. 429,19 L. Ed. 2d 683, 88 S. Ct. 664 (1968), the Court 
held that certain portions of the probate law of Oregon 
encroach upon the province of congress in the area of 
alien rights and stated that a statute conditioning in-
heritance by aliens on the alien's government redproca-
cation of right or the alien's government agreeing to re-
ciprocate is invalid as 
"An intrusion of the State into the field of for-
eign affairs . . . would make unavoidable judicial 
crticism of nations established on a more author-
itarian basis than the U. S." 
The Supreme Court also held that the probate law of 
Oregon was in conflict with the 1923 Treaty with Ger-
many. And stated that, 
"The Probate law of Oregon . . . affects inter-
national relations in a persistent, subtle way. 
The practices of State Courts in withholding 
remittances to legatees residing in Communist 
countries or in preventing them from assigning 
them is notorious." 
The Court then cites Berman, Soviet Heirs in American 
Courts, 62 Col. L. Rev. 257 (1962) and Chaitkin, The 
Rights of Residents of Russia and its Satellites to Share 
in Estates of American Decedents, 25 S. Cal. L. Rev. 297 
(1952). The Court then went on to state that 
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"The several states, of course, have traditionally 
regulated the descent and distribution of es-
tates, but those regulations must give way if 
they impair the effective exercise of the Na-
tion's foreign policy." 
It seems clear to Appellant that if statutes governing 
such traditional subjects of stat regulation as probate 
law fall when they encroach on the area of foreign policy 
then the cases above appear to leave no doubt that this 
principle would also apply to the instant case and render 
the Utah Statute invalid as it applies to aliens. 
There are other statutory provisions of the United 
States Code which apply to the instant situation and 
which appear to preempt Utah's right to subject aliens 
to special limitations. 42 U. S. Code § 1981, was origin-
ally enacted to protect the rights of negroes, but it has 
been held in Roberto v. Hartford Fire Insurance Com-
pany, 177 F. 2d 811 (C. A. I l l ) , Cert. Den., 339 U. S. 
929 (1949), that: 
"Although enacted primarily to insure equal 
civil rights of negroes, it has been held that the 
protection of this section extends to aliens as 
well as citizens.,, 
This statute was also cited in Oyama v. California, 332 
U. S. 633, 92 L. Ed. 249, 68 S. Ot. 269 (1948), the word-
ing of the statute is: 
"EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW" 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the U. S. 
shall have the same right in every state and 
territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
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be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property as enjoyed 
to white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, 
and exactions of every kind and to no other." 
The Charter of United Nations, Departtment of State 
Pub. 2368, pp. 1-20, which document both the U. S. and 
Italy are signatory to, there are many provisions relating 
to Human Rights Significant in this Area are: 
ARTICLE 55 
With a view to the creation of conditions of 
stability and well being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote: 
a. Higher Standard of Living, full employ-
ment, and conditions of economic and social pro-
gress and development; 
b. Solutions of international economic, so-
cial, health and related problems; and inter-
national cultural and educational cooperation; 
and 
c. Universal respect for, and observance of, 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language 
or religion. 
ARTICLE 56 
All members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the organi-
zation for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55. 
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In Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 
217 A (111) Gen. Assy. (10 Dec. 1948) as set forth in 
The United Nations and Human Rights, Infra., 
ARTICLE 2 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and free-
doms set forth in this declaration, without dis-
tinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, 
National and Social origin, property, birth or 
other status. 
Although the declarations are not binding on the mem-
bers of the United Nations, The United Nations and Hu-
man Rights, Infra, at P. 5, they represent the ideals and 
goals of the nations signatory to the chapter. 
In 1966, the Covenants on Human Relations, U. S. 
Dept. of State Pub. 2368 (1945), pp. 1-20, were accepted 
by the general assembly of the United Nations and it was 
provided that they become binding upon the Nations 
upon acceptance thereby. The United States Congress has 
not seen fit to accept or reject the covenants and are 
still, in fact, considering them. Utah purports to reject 
the United Nations Chapter, Universal Dedarataon of 
Human Rights and the Universal Covenaots on Human 
Rights, This, Appellant maintains, the State of Utah 
may not do in that it would and does encroach upon the 
foreign relations of the United States which is reserved 
to the Federal Government and further that the Utah 
statute operates to reject the Covenants on Human Re-
lations now before congress and subject to their ratifica-
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tion. According to Eighteenth Report of the Commission 
to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations 
and Human Rights, Oceana Pub. 1968 at page 15, the 
United States Senate has taken no formal action on these 
covenants but that of the special conventions on Human 
Rights drafted by the United Nation, five have been sub-
mitted to congress and one has been ratified as of 1968. 
As stated in Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitu-
tion, the Foundation Press, Inc., (1972) at Page 155. 
"For the United States parallel human rights 
undertakings have obvious foreign relations pur-
poses. In part she is concerned to maintain 
leadership in international affairs by proving that 
she deserves it, by her behavior at home and 
her willingness to join in cooperative interna-
tional efforts. In large part, she is concerned to 
see that minimum standards observed in other 
countries in order to safeguard her own stan-
dards, to promote conditions that are conducive 
to American Prosperity and to American inter-
ests in international peace and security. Of 
obvious, 'International Concern' to this country, 
for example would be an international conven-
tion fixing high labor standard or outlawing slav-
ery or forced labor. If it were adopted by the 
nations with which the United States competes 
to sell, manufacture goods in world markets. 
Other human rights are also of authentic inter-
national concern for the United States, witness 
apartheid in South Africa, events not long ago 
in communist countries . . ." 
"The United States, then does not adhere 
to human rights covenants in order to distort 
or circumvent our constitutional system, to leg-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
islate greater human rights for its own citizens 
by treaty rather than act of congress or to take 
additional matters from States into Federal do-
main; she adheres to such covenants in order to 
modify the behavior of other governments and 
the ways it effect the American interest. To get 
other nations to undertake to observe higher 
standards and to give the United States the 
right to request compliance with those stan-
dards, the United States is prepared to pay the 
price of undertaking to apply similar standards 
in the United States and to recognize other na-
tions request American appliance." 
This scholarly statement supports the holding in Zscher-
nig v. Miller, supra. That the laws of Oregon effect in-
ternational relations "in a persistent and subtle way" 
and cannot stand if they impair the effect exercise of 
of the Nation's foreign policy; the same is true of the 
Laws of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the Jury array was improp-
erly assembled, that the verdict was not supported by 
the evidence and that the Defendant was convicted un-
der an unconstitutional statute and therefore the Judg-
ment of the Lower Court should be reversed with instruc-
tions for the Lower Court to set aside the jury verdict and 
dismiss the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. W. LAURITZEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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